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ABSTRACT: If argument forms evolve then the possible existence of localized argument forms may
create an interpretive impasse between locally distinct argument communities. Appeal to
evolutionarily ‘deep’ argument forms may help, but might be strained in cases where emergent
argument forms are not reducible to their base conditions. Overcoming such limits presupposes the
virtue of compromise, suggesting that compromise may stand as ‘deep virtue’ within argumentative
forms of life.
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1. INTRODUCTION
A central feature of modern evolutionary theory is the idea that an organism’s
‘nature’ or ‘essence’ is not pre-established or pre-determined in some a-temporal, ahistorical sense, but is instead something that has a history in the sense that it can
be said to have come into being and may one day pass out of being over time. Closely
related to this is the equally important idea that an organism’s ‘nature’ or ‘essence’
is radically contingent in that it seems as if it could have been otherwise. Extended
to questions of logic and argumentation, this would suggest that such things as
logical rules, argumentation schemes, and so on, should also have an evolutionary
history that might mark them as contingent in some important respect. If so, then
we might ask ourselves whether there could be anything about our ‘nature’ that
might be considered necessary or evolutionarily deep conditions of logic or
argumentation. I want to explore this possibility and to suggest that some
conditions may indeed be considered necessary, evolutionarily deep conditions of
thought in general (and hence of logic and argumentation as well), and that included
among these are certain virtues. I want to further claim that not only is compromise
a virtue of argumentation, but that it may be an evolutionarily deep virtue as well. I
shall argue that a willingness to compromise is an expression of reasonableness in a
broad but fundamental sense, and that such a willingness may stand as a quasiconstitutive condition of our nature as logical animals. This paper is a tentative,
incomplete gesture towards making this case.
Mohammed, D., & Lewiński, M. (Eds.). Virtues of Argumentation. Proceedings of the 10th International Conference of the Ontario
Society for the Study of Argumentation (OSSA), 22-26 May 2013. Windsor, ON: OSSA, pp. 1-11.
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2. ARGUMENTATION AND EVOLUTION
There has been a growing interest lately in the relation between argumentation and
evolution. Part of the purpose of this paper is to take seriously some of the
possibilities that evolution may have for the theory of argumentation. Of particular
interest will be the possibility that the conditions underlying logic and
argumentation may have evolved, and that this might have important implications
for the possibility of argumentation between evolutionarily divergent groups. I want
to explore this idea and see what doors it may open or close.
Expressed in broad philosophical terms, evolutionary theory takes an
organism’s nature to be openly determinable, with the determining power lying
primarily if not exclusively in the external circumstances or milieu that make up the
organism’s environment. An organism’s nature is said to be formed by selective
pressures or constraints present within its external environment that select for
characteristics, traits, and so on over time that are adapted to the environment in
which such organisms are embedded. Since an organism’s nature is taken to be
determined primarily if not solely by its external environment, then the goodness or
fitness of an organism’s nature will always be relative to environment (as a
relational notion). It follows that while functions or traits may be good (i.e. adaptive
or fit) relative to the environment in which they evolved, those same traits may turn
out to be bad (i.e. maladaptive or unfit) relative to some other environment. Thus,
on this kind of evolutionary model, to speak of something being good or adaptive in
an absolute sense would seem to strain the meanings of those terms.
Environment is here taken to be a dynamic notion that necessarily involves
change over space and time. Environment can be understood in a taxonomic sense
as a collection of distinct, separate regions or sets, and it can also be understood in a
meronomic sense as a nested series one within another. Viewed in a taxonomic
sense, environments might be seen as existing alongside one another as spatially
isolated regions or temporally divided transformations or developmental stages,
while viewed in a meronomic sense, environments might be said to be spatially
larger and smaller or temporally older and younger. The implications for
argumentation depend upon which sense of environment one has in view.
If we take the capacities for language, communication, thought, reasoning,
cognition, and so on associated with argumentation as determinable parts of one’s
nature, it would seem to follow that such capacities would have been shaped by
processes of natural selection. It would also seem to follow that the goodness or
fitness of those capacities, e.g. their primary functions and so on, should be relative
to the constraints, demands, and so on, of the environmental circumstances in which
they evolved (as well as other sufficiently comparable environments). What does
this suggest?
If the conditions for argumentation did indeed evolve in this Darwinian
manner then it would seem that one must be open to the possibility that: 1)
Argumentation schemes, styles, and so on, are not absolute but historically and
environmentally determined (and hence are relative in some important sense), 2)
Some argumentation schemes, styles, and so on, might be older and younger,
broader and narrower than others, and 3) Argumentation schemes, styles, and so
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on, that evolved in radically isolated environments might be incongruous,
incommensurable, or incompatible. They might be incongruous in that each could
be maladaptive or out of place within the environment of another argument group,
they might be incommensurable in having no common measure of evaluation
between divergent groups, and they might be incompatible in that two divergent
could not co-exist within the same environment. If true, this could have a number of
important implications.
2.1 The possibility of radical impasse and the limits of argumentation
In argumentation it is not uncommon to arrive at an impasse, i.e. a blockage or dead
end of some sort that prohibits further advance of the argumentation process
understood in a broad sense (e.g. inquiry, debate, rhetorical persuasion, etc.).
Recognition of the importance of impasse in argumentation goes back at least to
Aristotle, who characterizes it not as a dead end, but more as a knot or a tangle that
one simply needs to untangle in order to then move forward once again.
(Metaphysics, 995a 24-995b 10) Implicit in Aristotle’s account is the presupposition
that minds are pre-attuned or pre-adapted both to one another and to the world,
making an impasse a temporary state that results from a faulty analysis, a deficit of
information, or some other temporary condition that is capable of being overcome.
While this Aristotelian account of impasse may work well within a classical
conception of being it becomes more problematic and questionable when placed
within an evolutionary model, for within an evolutionary model the traditional
presuppositions regarding the pre-attuned or pre-adapted relation of mind-to-mind
and mind-to-world are called into question. On an evolutionary model it can no
longer be presupposed, for example, that mind is pre-attuned to discerning the truth
in things for there is no guarantee that mind has evolved to satisfy that epistemic
function. Similarly, it can no longer be presupposed that minds are universally preattuned to other minds for it is possible that genetically isolated groups could have
developed or emphasized different mental capacities or argumentative schemes
whose adaptive functions are so distinct as to result in a radical breakdown in the
possibility of argumentation across or between such groups. The possibility of such
radical forms of impasse suggests that the universality of mental capacities,
argument schemes, and so on, can no longer be presupposed but must instead be
argued for as necessary move in an intriguing and important philosophical question.
The possibility of such radical forms of impasse also suggests that there may
be real, insurmountable limits to the capacity for argumentation to promote or
advance a common or shared understanding, appreciation, cooperation, and so on,
between some groups. Such limits would seem to imply that there may be moments
when a process of argumentation is brought to an end, not because of any
unwillingness on the part of its participants to continue with the process, but
because of some fundamental incompatibility between the argument schemes
employed. While some might be willing to accept such limits and let things stand as
they are, others might interpret those same limits as justification for adopting other,
non-argumentative means of deciding things, as exemplified in Alexander the Great
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who, rather than trying to untangle the Gordian knot, opted instead to simply sever
it with his sword.
There are a number of ways in which one might respond to this ‘just so’
story: 1) One could take the possibility of such limits to argumentation as
supporting a relativistic conception of argumentation, logic, truth, and so on (e.g.
Whorf), 2) One could try and counter the implications of the evolutionary model
with a transcendental argument regarding the impossibility of any principled
impasse or claim to incommensurability (e.g. Davidson), or 3) One could adopt a
quasi-Aristotelian approach and accept the reality of such limits as possible within
some real, practical context, while also seeing those limits as revisable within a
larger, evolutionary context (e.g. Whitehead). I will defend a combination of 2 and 3.
3. EVOLUTION AND LOGICAL ANIMALS
One of the earliest philosophers to fully embrace the evolutionary model in a broad,
systematic sense was C. S. Peirce. Peirce’s semio-illative theory of argumentation
rests upon the idea of evolution, not merely in a biological sense, but in a much
broader logical, cosmological, and metaphysical rendering of that notion. Central to
Peirce’s account of argumentation is that the principles of argumentation, i.e. the
principles of logic, the forms of schemes of argumentation, and so on, evolve, that is,
they come to be over time. It is the evolutionary development of the conditions of
argumentation, taken in its broadest sense, that mark us as “in the main logical
animals.” (Peirce, 1877, p. 112) What makes us ‘logical’ in Peirce’s broad use of that
term is our capacity to learn and improve our condition in life through mental
processes that are self-correcting. (Peirce, 1898, pp. 42-47) Put simply, as logical
animals we possess the capacity to take the process of evolutionary development
into our own hands, thereby improving our own condition in a self-directed manner.
Peirce cautions, however, that while we are “in the main logical animals, “we are not
perfectly so.”
Logicality in regard to practical matters is the most useful quality an animal can
possess, and might, therefore, result from the action of natural selection; but outside
of these it is probably of more advantage to the animal to have his mind filled with
pleasing and encouraging visions, independently of their truth; and thus, upon
unpractical subjects, natural selection might occasion a fallacious tendency of
thought. (Peirce, 1877, p. 112)

The thing that we can count on to save us from our fallacious tendencies is our
capacity for logical self-correction based on the evidence or work of experience, i.e.
the unrelenting, existential demands of life and environment to which we must
continuously or at least periodically adapt. (Peirce, 1877, p. 112; 1903a, p. 194)
Central to Peirce’s account of our nature as logical animals is the idea that the
principles, methods, and so on that underlie our argumentative practices have been
shaped by evolutionary forces. This means that the particular principles, methods,
and so on that we employ in our argumentative practices have come into being as
adaptive responses to environmental constraints through experience. Thus, what
Peirce calls the leading principles of logic, for example, i.e. the principles according
4
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to which an inferential series can be said to follow from one another in what we take
to be a ‘logical’ sense, are actually habits of mind that have been developed, tested,
and reinforced against the checks and balances of experience. (Peirce, 1880, pp.
201-205)
On this account it seems possible that evolutionarily isolated groups could
evolve different kinds of leading principles and argument schemes depending on the
local environment that helped shape them. One could attempt to counter such
hypothetical problems by appealing to those leading, logical principles that might be
shared across all argument groups, but this seems to presuppose that newer or
more recently developed leading principles can be reduced to older, evolutionarily
deeper principles, and it is not clear that this is the case. It is even less clear how
such a reduction could provide a sufficient basis for overcoming any impasse that
might happen to arise. It is not clear, for example, that appealing to the deep logical
principle of the nota notae (i.e. “the law that if a is b and b is c, it can be concluded
that a is c”, a principle that Peirce goes so far as to call the fundamental “law of
thought” will go very far in helping to resolve an impasse arising from more recently
developed argument schemes whose only commonality is their shared grounding in
the nota notae. So where does this leave us?
If these kinds of radical impasses are indeed possible (and I want to suggest
that they are), then this would imply that there might be important limits to
argumentation that, when encountered, open the way to non-argumentative
mechanisms or courses of action (e.g. Alexander’s sword) that would ‘kick in,’ as it
were, when the limit or end of argumentation is reached. There is little doubt that
when a serious impasse or limit of argumentation is encountered (whether radical
or not), recourse to non-argumentative alternatives does sometimes happen. I want
to suggest, however, that even when such limits are encountered (whether they are
apparent or real), such impasses do not mark the limits of argumentation in general,
but rather the limits of some particular, historically situated conditions of
argumentation. On the evolutionary model defended here, it would be a mistake to
conclude that any particular, historically situated conditions of argumentation
express the absolute or fixed conditions of argumentation in general. If we are to
take such evolutionary accounts of argumentation seriously, then the conditions of
argumentation are not to be read as having been given once and for all (as eternally
fixed transcendental conditions in the spirit of Kant), but should instead be
interpreted as elements of a dynamic, determinable, continuously evolving process
that we might refer to as argumentation in general. Viewed in this respect, while
there will always be particular limits to argumentation, such limits should always be
taken as contextual and historically situated, and hence as capable of being
traversed or overcome by the emergence or construction of new conditions that
would eventually remove or resolve any impasse encountered. Put simply, while the
kinds of radical, insurmountable impasses outlined here could indeed be possible
(as marking the limits of the conditions of argumentation presently available to
those argument groups), such limits should never be presumed to be fixed or
absolute, but should instead be viewed as temporary, historically situated limits that
can be traversed or overcome through the emergence of evolutionarily novel
conditions. Thus, while such radical impasses would be real within the particular,
5
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historically situated conditions of argumentation that happen to be employed by the
groups involved, viewed from a broader, evolutionary perspective such limits
should be seen as temporary and as capable of being surpassed or overcome.
3.1 Evolution and the historicization of limits
As we have already seen, the idea that impasses are temporary and are capable of
being overcome goes back at least as far as the work of Aristotle, and likely beyond
that. But the same cannot be said for the idea of limits. It has been claimed, for
example, that one of the distinguishing features of western classical thought, at least
as expressed within the dominant traditions, is the widespread belief that there are
fixed, pre-determined limits to humanity’s place in the world, including absolute
limits on humanity’s epistemic, logical, and argumentative capacities that cannot be
overcome. (Jonas, 1974; 1979) The idea that limits are not fixed in the classical
sense, but can be surpassed or overcome first arises in a serious way within the
western theological belief that humans are created in the image of God, a belief that
eventually gave rise to the idea that humans are inherently creative in a god-like
sense. (Rose, 2002; 2009) This idea is gradually extended, in the work of Vico, Hegel,
Schelling, and others, to a more historicized account of limits as part of the
developmental phases of nature, thought, or being. Even so, it is not until the work
of Darwin that the radical historicization of limits as part of a truly evolutionary,
unlimited process, becomes widely established, an idea that is then very quickly
taken up in the philosophical work of Peirce, Nietzsche, and others, as applying to
nature, cosmology, and being as such.
I take this shift towards a more historicized account of limits as the result, at
least in part, of lessons learned from rigorous study, research, and reflection over
centuries of experience viewed in a collective, institutional, or dare I say a corporate
sense. While the historicized view of limits may not be true in any final or absolute
sense, it should at least be taken as truthful in some significant sense, that is, as
revealing something important about the conditions of life and of being in general. I
want to suggest that this historicized view of limits has been taken up and become
ingrained within the human condition as an essential feature of our nature as logical
animals. More precisely, I claim that this historicized sense of limit is embedded and
expressed in what Leibniz, Peirce and others have identified as the principle of
reason and the principle of hope. I want to also suggest that historicized sense of
limit is also embedded and expressed in the virtue of compromise, a virtue that runs
deep within our nature as logical animals.
3.2 Reason, hope, and the principle of reasonableness
As noted, the idea that limits are not absolute or fixed, but historical is expressed in
two important and closely related logical principles that are taken up and developed
by Peirce: 1) The principle of reason, and 2) The principle of hope. The principle of
reason, as re-formulated in Peirce’s evolutionary philosophy, can be summarized in
two logical imperatives or maxims: 1) “Do not block the way of inquiry,” (Peirce,
1898, pp. 48-50) and 2) “Never allow yourself to think that any definite problem is
6
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incapable of being solved to any assignable degree of perfection.” (Peirce 1903a:
188) Closely related to this is the principle of hope, which Peirce identifies as the
most basic, underlying principle of abduction, namely, the “fundamental or
primary… hypothesis that the facts in hand admit of rationalization, and of
rationalization by us.” As logical animals “we are bound to assume” that our minds
are capable of advancing beyond our present cognitive state “independently of any
evidence that it is true.” (Peirce, 1901, pp. 106-107) Both the principle of reason and
the principle of hope rest upon the presupposition that there is “an element of
Reasonableness” in the world, an element that not only makes people and things
inherently intelligible in the present sense, but that also includes the possibility that
what might now appear less intelligible or less reasonable can become or be made
more so in the future (both in an epistemic and an ontological sense).
I want to follow Peirce in claiming that this element of reasonableness
understood as an inherent openness to reason and reasonability is part of our very
nature as logical animals, and hence is an essential aspect of argument and
argumentation in general. (Peirce, 1869, p. 72, 72n; 1903b, p. 255; 1904, pp. 307308, p. 313, pp. 322-324; 1905, p. 343) What Peirce calls the element of
reasonableness in things manifests itself in the intertwined principles of reason and
hope, principles that I want to suggest run so deep within our evolution as logical
animals as to stand as something akin to what Apel calls principles of
“transcendental pragmatics,” i.e. “the transcendental pragmatic foundation” for the
possibility of “practical discourse” and argumentation in general. (Apel, 2001, pp.
166-177) Understood in this sense, the principles of reason and hope would indeed
stand as constitutive, enabling, transcendental conditions for the possibility of
argumentation, but they would stand so in a historicized, evolutionary, pragmatic
sense rather than the kind of “dogmatic transcendentalism” expressed in Kant (and
others) (Apel, 2001, p. 168). Thus such principles would be more akin to the kind of
“relativized, historicized, and dynamical” a priori principles outlined by Michael
Friedman, principles that have a “constitutive function of making possible” but
which are at the same time products of a historical, evolutionary process.
(Friedman, 2004, pp. 86-87) Central to this proposal is what I would characterize as
a deep-seated, growing belief that difficulties or problems encountered in the
general work of argument and argumentation (including the advance of knowledge)
are historical in nature and hence are inherently open to being traversed or
overcome by a future state of consensual, truthful agreement “which would be the
same for all,” a belief that Peirce calls “the faith of the logician” and which he claims
to provide logic with “its reason of existence.” (Peirce, 1880, p. 202) I want to
further suggest that this same spirit of reasonableness also extends into the virtue of
compromise, with compromise itself being a further, more practical expression of
these fundamental principles.
4. COMPROMISE AS A VIRTUE OF ARGUMENTATION
According to J.P. Day, compromise is “an agreement between A and B to make
mutual concessions in order to resolve a conflict between them.” (Day, 1989, p. 472)
As Day rightly notes, compromise is part of what he identifies as the “Give and
7
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Receive Family” of relations, and differs from other members of this family (such as
gratitude or exchange) in that with compromise each side of the relation must both
gain and lose something. (Day, 1989, p. 476) I would add that in its ideal sense,
compromise requires not only that the concessions in question be mutually and
voluntarily agreed upon, but they should also be deemed fair and duly proportioned
by the parties involved (with no evidence of deception or self-deception within
either party). Understood in this qualified sense, compromise can indeed stand as a
better or preferred means of resolving disputes than other alternatives such as
adjudication, as Day rightly claims. (Day, 1989, p. 476)
I want to suggest first that compromise is a virtue of argumentation.
Expressed more precisely and with respect to Andrew Aberdein’s point that virtue
theories of argumentation should be “agent-based” (Aberdein, 2013, p. 4); I want to
suggest that a willingness or openness to compromise is a virtue of arguers. It is a
virtue in both argument construction as well as argument appraisal, for it involves a
tacit (or in the ideal case, an explicit) recognition and appreciation of the value of
other arguers, the value of autonomy, the partiality of one’s own perspective, and
the complex, dynamic, evolutionary nature of the world we inhabit. What I am
calling a willingness or openness to compromise is compatible with what Dan Cohen
has identified as “especially important critical virtues—open mindedness and a
sense of proportion.” (Cohen, 2009, p. 50) Cohen characterizes open-mindedness as
“a willingness to take what others say seriously” and a willingness to revise or
modify one’s own position, (Cohen, 2009, p. 56) and compromise involves both
those notions. With respect to “a sense of proportion,” compromise implies an
ability to recognize what we might loosely describe as the ‘practical limit’ of an
impasse (at least in a temporary, historical sense) as a first step in the process of
working out a compromise. Thus, understood in this sense, compromise can be seen
as standing between two extremes (or vices) that Cohen also addresses, namely, 1)
being uncompromising in the sense of being “obstinate and inflexible” (Day, 1989, p.
471, p. 473), an unwillingness to listen that Cohen identifies as the “Deaf Dogmatist”,
and 2) being overly compromising in the sense of being a “trimmer and a time
server” (Day, 1989, p. 471) or what Cohen calls the “Concessionaire, who
undermines his own arguments with unnecessary concessions.” (Aberdein, 2013, p.
7) Viewed in this respect, a willingness to compromise does indeed seem to qualify
as a virtue in the traditional sense.
Importantly, while the term ‘compromise’ is sometimes taken to have an
ambivalent sense, as Day clearly shows, such ambivalence resides not in the notion
of compromise as such (properly understood), but results instead from confusion
regarding the different ways in which the term ‘compromise’ is used. More
specifically, the apparent ambiguity associated with compromise results when
compromise as a virtue is conflated with a very different use of the same term as in
being compromised or being compromising. As day notes, to compromise in the
virtuous sense is a very different kind of thing than being compromised in the sense
of compromising one’s integrity, one’s morals, and so on, and the ambiguity
sometimes associated with the term is the result of confusion regarding the
transitive and intransitive senses of the term. More precisely, the negative sense of
compromise comes from its use as a transitive verb, e.g. A compromised B, while the
8
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positive sense comes from its use as an intransitive verb, e.g. to compromise with or
to compromise between. Day argues that it is only when compromise is used in a
transitive sense that it has negative connotations, whereas in its other intransitive
uses compromise is a good thing. (Day, 1989, pp. 472-475, pp. 478-479) I want to
agree with Day in this and to claim that in the intransitive sense outlined here,
compromise is a virtue.
4.1 Compromise as a deep virtue
By a deep virtue I mean a virtue whose evolutionary history is both old and
extensive. It is old in the sense that its function has a long and stable evolutionary
history, and it is extensive in the sense that the same function can be found within a
wide range of peoples and places. I want to suggest that compromise is a deep virtue
that may well be coextensive with the conditions for the possibility of
argumentation in general.
As already noted one of the primary preconditions of our nature as logical
animals is that people and things are reasonable in two senses: 1) They are
intelligible, and 2) They are determinable by conditions that are taken to be rational
or intelligible in some general sense (e.g. laws of nature, reasons, etc.). 1 It follows, I
would venture, that argumentation also presupposes that people (or agents) are
reasonable in this dual sense: 1) Argumentation presupposes that the parties of an
argument-relation (e.g. two persons, a person and a text, or any other argumentrelation) are intelligible, and 2) Argumentation also presupposes that the agents of
the argument relation are determinable by reasons in the broad sense that they are
capable of being influenced, persuaded, moved, or altered in some way by the play
of reasons present within the argument process (e.g. two persons involved in an
exchange of arguments, or a person interpreting a text). Thus, the principle of
reasonableness can be taken to be a deep principle, a principle that stands as
transcendental condition for the possibility of argumentation in the pragmatist
sense outlined above.
It would follow here that certain virtues relating to the principle of
reasonableness might also be said to run deep within the human conditions, ethical
virtues such as temperance, prudence, wisdom, and so on, epistemic virtues such as
a willingness to learn, open-mindedness, fairness, and so on, and argumentative
virtues such as a willingness to listen, a sense of proportion, and so on once again.
So why the current emphasis on compromise, what is it about compromise that
would lead one to include it among the deep virtues of argumentation? To properly
answer this requires that we properly situate ourselves within an evolutionary
perspective.
Thus, things can be said to be rationally determinable by agents insofar as they are open to being
ordered, transformed, produced, and so on using rational methods for rational purposes (the most
obvious example of this being the production of technologies), and agents are rationally
determinable by things insofar as we are open to being influenced by the nature of things (the most
obvious example being the a posteriori processes of learning from experience, e.g. observation,
experimentation, and so on).
1
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Impasses and conflicts of various kinds are common features of life. As Day
points out, the question of how to resolve such impasses and conflicts “is obviously
a subject of great practical importance.” (Day, 1989, p. 471) It should also be a
subject of great evolutionary importance, for it would be most beneficial to have
methods of conflict resolution that served to minimize disadvantageous outcomes,
especially those involving existential risks. Now there are multiple ways of resolving
impasses and conflicts, but the advantages of compromise include: 1) Since
compromise is mutually agreed upon rather than enforced it is less likely to be
interpreted in a strongly negative sense, 2) Since gains and concessions apply to
each party reciprocally there is a reasonable expectation that the resolution will be
equitable, 3) Because compromise implies the recognition of the value and rights of
each party (as an important political and moral act) it may help enable cooperative
relations between parties in the future, and 4) It follows that compromise is likely to
result in a more enduring resolution, thereby minimizing existential and other
forms of risk to both parties. I would add here that a willingness to compromise
might itself be shaped and reinforced by the long term work of experience, for such
experience would help disclose or bring to light a greater awareness of the finitude
and partiality of perspectives as well as the dynamic, fluid, continuously evolving
character of ourselves and the world in which we are embedded.
On this account, a willingness to compromise is itself a form of
reasonableness that may well stand not only as a deep virtue, but as a vitally
important virtue that should be nourished as a central virtue of argumentation in
general. For a willingness to compromise in the sense outlined here expresses a
deep sense of reasonableness that includes everything from the reasonableness of
the agents involved in the argument-relation to the reasonableness of the social,
political, and material conditions within which such agents are embedded. A
willingness to compromise expresses not only a recognition of the value and rights
of the parties involved, it also expresses a deep seated hope in the possibility of a
future, emergent state of increasingly inclusive cooperation.
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